Abstract-Self modifying code is code that modifies its own instructions during execution time. It is nowadays widely used, especially in malware to make the code hard to analyse and to detect by anti-viruses. Thus, the analysis of such self modifying programs is a big challenge. Pushdown systems (PDSs) is a natural model that is extensively used for the analysis of sequential programs because they allow to accurately model procedure calls and mimic the program's stack. In this work, we propose to extend the PushDown System model with selfmodifying rules. We call the new model Self-Modifying PushDown System (SM-PDS). A SM-PDS is a PDS that can modify its own set of transitions during execution. We show how SMPDSs can be used to naturally represent self-modifying programs and provide efficient algorithms to compute the backward and forward reachable configurations of SM-PDSs. We implemented our techniques in a tool and obtained encouraging results. In particular, we successfully applied our tool for the detection of self-modifying malware.
I. INTRODUCTION
Self-modifying code is code that modifies its own instructions during execution time. It is nowadays widely used, mainly to make programs hard to understand. For example, self-modifying code is extensively used to protect software intellectual property, since it makes reverse code engineering harder. It is also abundantly used by malware writers in order to obfuscate their malicious code and make it hard to analyse by static analysers and anti-viruses.
There are several kinds of implementations for selfmodifying codes. Packing [1] consists in applying compression techniques to make the size of the executable file smaller. This converts the executable file to a form where the executable content is hidden. Then, the code is "unpacked" at runtime before execution. Such packed code is self-modifying. Encryption is another technique to hide the code. It uses some kind of invertible operations to hide the executable code with an encryption key. Then, the code is "decrypted" at runtime prior to execution. Encrypted programs are self-modifying. These two forms of self-modifying codes have been well studied in the litterature and could be handled by several unpacking tools such as [2] , [3] .
In this work, we consider another kind of self-modifying code, caused by self-modifying instructions, where code is treated as data that can thus be read and written by selfmodifying instructions. These self-modifying instructions are usually mov instructions, since mov can access memory, and read and write to it. For example, consider the program shown in Fig.1 . For simplification matters, we suppose that the addresses' length is 1 byte. The binary code is given in the left side, while in the right side, we give its corresponding assembly code obtained by translating syntactically the binary code at each address. For example, ff is the binary code of the instruction push, thus, the first line is translated to push 0x3, the second line to push 0b, etc. Let us execute this code. First, we execute push 0x3, then push 0b, then mov 0x2 0xc. This last instruction will replace the first byte at address 0x2 by 0xc. Thus, at address 0x2, ff 0b is replaced by 0c 0b. Since 0c is the binary code of jmp, this means the instruction push 0b is replaced by jmp 0xb. Therefore, this code is self-modifying. If we treat it blindly, without looking at the semantics of the different instructions, we will extract from it the Control Flow Graph CFG a, whereas its correct Control Flow Graph is CFG b. You can see that the mov instruction was able to modify the instructions of the program successfully via its ability to read and write the memory.
In this paper, we consider the reachability analysis of selfmodifying programs where the code is modified by mov instructions. To this aim, we first need to find an adequate model for such programs. PushDown Systems (PDS) are known to be a natural model for sequential programs [4] , as they allow to track the contexts of the different calls in the program. Moreover, PushDown Systems allow to record and mimic the program's stack, which is very important for malware detection. Indeed, to check whether a program is malicious, anti-viruses start by identifying the calls it makes to the API functions. To evade these checks, malware writers try to obfuscate the calls they make to the Operating System by using pushes and jumps. Thus, it is important to be able to track the stack to detect such obfuscated calls. This is why PushDown Systems were used in [5] , [6] , [7] to model binary programs in order to perform malware detection. However, these works do not consider malwares that use self-modifying code, as PushDown Systems are not able to model selfmodifying instructions.
To overcome this limitation, we propose in this work to extend the PushDown System model with self-modifying rules. We call the new model Self-Modifying PushDown System (SM-PDS). Roughly speaking, a SM-PDS is a PDS that can modify its own set of transitions during execution. We show how SM-PDSs can be used to naturally represent selfmodifying programs. It turns out that SM-PDSs are equivalent to standard PDSs. We show how to translate a SM-PDS to a standard PDS. This translation is exponential. Thus, performing the reachability analysis on the equivalent PDS is not efficient. We propose then direct algorithms to compute the forward (post * ) and backward (pre * ) reachability sets for SM- PDSs. This allows to efficiently perform reachability analysis for self-modifying programs. Our algorithms are based on (1) representing regular (potentially infinite) sets of configurations of SM-PDSs using finite state automata, and (2) applying saturation procedures on the finite state automata in order to take into account the effect of applying the rules of the SM-PDS. We implemented our algorithms in a tool that takes as input either an SM-PDS or a self-modifying program. Our experiments show that our direct techniques are much more efficient than translating the SM-PDS to an equivalent PDS and then applying the standard reachability algorithms for PDSs [8] , [9] , [4] . Moreover, we successfuly applied our tool to the analysis of several self-modifying malwares.
Outline. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our new model and shows how to translate a SM-PDS to an equivalent pushdown system. In Section 3, we give the translation from a binary code to a SM-PDS. In Section 4, we define finite automata to represent regular (potentially infinite) sets of configurations of SMPDSs. Sections 5 and 6 give our algorithms to compute the backward and forward reachability sets of SM-PDSs. Section 7 drescribes our experiments.
Related Work. Reachability analysis of pushdown systems were considered in [8] , [9] . Our algorithms are extensions of the saturation approach of these works.
Model checking and static analysis approaches have been widely used to analyze binary programs, for instance, in [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [7] , [15] . These works cannot handle self-modifying code.
Cai et al. [16] use a Hoare-logic-style framework to describe self-modifying code by applying local reasoning and separation logic, and treating program code uniformly as regular data structure. However, [16] requires programs to be manually annotated with invariants. In [1] , the authors describe a formal semantics for self-modifying codes, and use that semantics to represent self-unpacking code. This work only deals with packing and unpacking behaviours, it cannot capture selfmodifying instructions as we do. In [17] , Bonfante et al. provide an operational semantics for self-modifying programs and show that they can be constructively rewritten to a nonmodifying program. All these specifications [17] , [16] , [1] are too abstract to be used in practice.
In [18] , the authors propose a new representation of selfmodifying code named State Enhanced-Control Flow Graph (SE-CFG). SE-CFG extends standard control flow graphs with a new data structure, keeping track of the possible states programs can reach, and with edges that can be conditional on the state of the target memory location. It is not easy to analyse a binary program only using its SE-CFG, especially that this representation does not allow to take into account the stack of the program. [19] propose abstract interpretation techniques to compute an over-approximation of the set of reachable states of a self-modifying program, where for each control point of the program, an over-approximation of the memory state at this control point is provided. [20] combine static and dynamic analysis techniques to analyse self-modifying programs. Unlike our self-modifying pushdown systems, these techniques [19] , [20] cannot handle the program's stack.
Finally, unpacking binary code is considered in [21] , [22] , [23] , [1] . These works do not consider self-modifying mov instructions.
II. SELF-MODIFYING PUSHDOWN SYSTEMS

A. Definition
We introduce in this section our new model: Self-modifying Pushdown Systems. Definition 2.1: A Self-modifying Pushdown System (SM-PDS) is a tuple P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ), where P is a finite set of control points, Γ is a finite set of stack symbols, ∆ ⊆ (P ×Γ)× (P × Γ * ) is a finite set of transition rules, and ∆ c ⊆ P × (∆ ∪ ∆ c )×(∆∪∆ c )×P is a finite set of modifying transition rules. If ((p, γ), (p , ω)) ∈ ∆, we also write p, γ → p , ω ∈ ∆.
If (p, r 1 , r 2 , p ) ∈ ∆ c , we also write p (r1,r2)
Intuitively, a Self-modifying Pushdown System is a Pushdown System that can dynamically modify its set of rules during the execution time: rules ∆ are standard PDS transition rules, while rules ∆ c modify the current set of transition rules: p, γ → p , ω ∈ ∆ expresses that if the SM-PDS is in control point p and has γ on top of its stack, then it can move to control point p , pop γ and push ω onto the stack, while p (r1,r2) −−−−→ p ∈ ∆ c expresses that when the PDS is in control point p, then it can move to control point p , remove the rule r 1 from its current set of transition rules, and add the rule r 2 . Formally, a configuration of a SM-PDS is a tuple c = ( p, ω , θ) where p ∈ P is the control point, ω ∈ Γ * is the stack content, and θ ⊆ ∆ ∪ ∆ c is the current set of transition rules of the SM-PDS. θ is called the current phase of the SM-PDS. When the SM-PDS is a PDS, i.e., when ∆ c = ∅, a configuration is a tuple c = ( p, ω , ∆), since there is no changing rule, so there is only one possible phase. In this case, we can also write c = p, ω . Let C be the set of configurations of a SM-PDS. A SM-PDS defines a transition relation ⇒ P between configurations as follows: Let c = ( p, ω , θ) be a configuration, and let r be a rule in θ, then:
In other words, the transition rule r updates the current set of transition rules θ by removing r 1 from it and adding r 2 to it. 2) if r ∈ ∆ is of the form r = p, γ → p , w ∈ ∆, then ( p, γw , θ) ⇒ P ( p , w w , θ). In other words, the transition rule r moves the control point from p to p , pops γ from the stack and pushes w onto the stack. This transition keeps the current set of transition rules θ unchanged.
Let ⇒ * P be the transitive, reflexive closure of ⇒ P . We remove the subscript P when it is clear from the context. Given a configuration c, the set of immediate predecessors (resp. successors) of c is pre P (c) = {c ∈ C : c ⇒ P c} (resp. post P (c) = {c ∈ C : c ⇒ P c }). These notations can be generalized straightforwardly to sets of configurations. Let pre * P (resp. post * P ) denote the reflexive-transitive closure of pre P (resp. post P ). We omit the subscript P when it is understood from the context.
B. From SM-PDSs to PDSs
An SM-PDS can be described by a PDS. This is due to the fact that the number of phases is finite, thus, we can encode phases in the control points of the PDS: Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS, we compute the PDS P = (P , Γ, ∆ ) as follows:
∆∪∆c , r ∈ θ:
It is easy to see that:
Thus, we get: Theorem 2.1: Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS, we can compute an equivalent PDS P = (P , Γ, ∆ ) such that
C. From SM-PDSs to symbolic PDSs
Instead of recording the phases θ of the SM-PDS in the control points of the equivalent PDS, we can have a more compact translation from SM-PDSs to symbolic PDSs [4] , where each SM-PDS rule is represented by a single, symbolic transition, where the different values of the phases are encoded in a symbolic way using relations between phases: Definition 2.2: A symbolic pushdown system is a tuple P = (P, Γ, δ), where P is a set of control points, Γ is the stack alphabet, and δ is a set of symbolic rules of the form:
A symbolic PDS defines a transition relation ; P between SM-PDS configurations as follows: Let c = ( p, γw , θ) be a configuration and let p, γ R −−−−→ p , w be a rule in δ, then: ( p, γw , θ) ; P ( p , ww , θ ) for (θ, θ ) ∈ R. Let ; * P be the transitive, reflexive closure of ; P . Then, given a SM-PDS P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ), we can compute an equivalent symbolic PDS P = (P, Γ, ∆ ) such that: Initially, ∆ = ∅;
• For every p, γ → p , w ∈ ∆, add p, γ R id −−−−→ p , w to ∆ , where R id is the identity relation.
• For every r = p (r1,r2)
Thus, we get: Theorem 2.2: Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS, we can compute an equivalent symbolic PDS P = (P , Γ, ∆ ) such that |P | = |P |, |∆ | = |∆| + |∆ c | · |Γ|, and the size of the relations used in the symbolic transitions is 2 O(|∆|+|∆c|) .
III. MODELING SELF-MODIFYING CODE WITH SM-PDSS
A. Self-modifying instructions
There are different techniques to implement self-modifying code. We consider in this work code that uses self-modifying instructions. These are instructions that can access the memory locations and write onto them, thus changing the instructions that are in these memory locations. In assembly, the only instructions that can do this are the mov instructions. In this case, the self-modifying instructions are of the form mov l v, where l is a location of the program that stores executable data and v is a value. This instruction replaces the value at location l (in the binary code) with the value v. This means if at location l there is a binary value v that is involved in an assembly instruction i 1 , and if by replacing v by v, we obtain a new assembly instruction i 2 , then the instruction i 1 is replaced by i 2 . E.g., ff is the binary code of push, 40 is the binary code of inc, 0c is the binary code of jmp, c6 is the binary code of mov, etc. Thus, if we have mov l ff, and if at location l there was initially the value 40 01 (which corresponds to the assembly instruction inc %edx), then 40 is replaced by ff, which means the instruction inc %edx is replaced by push 01. If at location l there was initially the value c6 01 02 (which corresponds to the assembly instruction mov edx 0x2), then c6 is replaced by ff, which means the instruction mov edx 0x2 is replaced by push 02.
Note that if the instructions i 1 and i 2 do not have the same number of operands, then mov l v will, in addition to replacing i 1 by i 2 , change several other instructions that follow i 1 . Currently, we cannot handle this case, thus we assume that i 1 and i 2 have the same number of operands.
Note also that mov l v is self-modifying only if l is a location of the program that stores executable data, otherwise, it is not; e.g., mov eax v does not change the instructions of the program, it just writes the value v to the register eax. Thus, from now on, by self-modifying instruction, we mean an instruction of the form mov l v, where l is a location of the program that stores executable data. Moreover, to ensure that only one instruction is modified, we assume that the corresponding instructions i 1 and i 2 have the same number of operands.
B. From self-modifying code to SM-PDS
We show in what follows how to build a SM-PDS from a binary program. We suppose we are given an oracle O that extracts from the binary code a corresponding assembly program, together with informations about the values of the registers and the memory locations at each control point of the program. In our implementation, we use Jakstab [24] and IDA Pro [25] to get this oracle. We translate the assembly program into a self-modifying pushdown system where the control locations store the control points of the binary program and the stack memics the program's stack. The non selfmodifying instructions of the program define the rules ∆ of the SM-PDS (which are standard PDS rules), and can be obtained following the translation of [5] that models non self-modifying instructions of the program by a PDS.
As for the self-modifying instructions of the program, they define the set of changing rules ∆ c . As explained above, these are instructions of the form mov l v, where l is a location of the program that stores executable data. This instruction replaces the value at location l (in the binary code) with the value v. Let i 1 be the initial instruction involving the location l, and let i 2 be the new instruction involving the location l, after applying the mov l v instruction. As mentionned previously, we assume that i 1 and i 2 have the same number of operands (to ensure that only one instruction is modified). Let r 1 (resp. r 2 ) be the SM-PDS rule corresponding to the instruction i 1 (resp. i 2 ). Suppose from control point n to n , we have this mov l v instruction, then we add n (r1,r2) −−−−→ n to ∆ c . This is the SM-PDS rule corresponding to the instruction mov l v at control point n.
IV. REPRESENTING INFINITE SETS OF CONFIGURATIONS
OF A SM-PDS Multi-automata were introduced in [8] , [9] to finitely represent regular infinite sets of configurations of a PDS. A configuration c = ( p, ω , θ) of a SM-PDS involves a PDS configuration p, ω , together with the current set of transition rules (phase) θ. To finitely represent regular infinite sets of such configurations, we extend multi-automata in order to take into account the phases θ:
Definition 4.1: Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS. A Pautomaton is a tuple A = (Q, Γ, T, P, F, f ) where Γ is the automaton alphabet, Q is a finite set of states, P ⊆ Q its set of initial states, T ⊂ Q × Γ ∪ { } × Q is the set of transitions, F ⊆ Q is the set of final states, and f : T → 2 2 ∆∪∆c a function that associates to each transition of T a set of phases. For (q, γ, q ) ∈ T , we write q γ − → T q . We extend this notation in the obvious manner to sequences of symbols: (1) ∀q ∈ Q, q − → T q, and (2) ∀q, q ∈ Q, ∀γ ∈ Γ ∪ { }, ∀w ∈ Γ * , q 
A configuration ( p, w , θ) is accepted by the automaton A iff there exists p ∈ P and a path p
. Let L(A) be the set of configurations accepted by A. Let C be a set of configurations of the SM-PDS P. C is regular if there exists a P-automaton A such that C = L(A).
V. EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OF pre * IMAGES Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS, and let A = (Q, Γ, T, P, F, f ) be a P-automaton that represents a regular set of configurations C ( C = L(A)). To compute pre * (C), one can use the translation of Section II-B to compute an equivalent PDS, and then apply the algorithms of [8] , [9] . This procedure is too complex since the size of the obtained PDS is huge. One can also use the translation of Section II-C to compute an equivalent symbolic PDS, and then use the algorihms of [4] . However, this procedure is not optimal neither since the number of elements of the relations considered in the rules of the symbolic PDSs are huge. We present in this section a direct and more efficient algorithm that computes pre * (C) without any need to translate the SM-PDS to an equivalent PDS or symbolic PDS. We assume w.l.o.g. that A has no transitions leading to an initial state. We also assume that the self-modifying rules r = p −−−−→ p , where r ⊥ is a new fake rule that we can add to all phases.
The construction of A pre * follows the same idea as for standard pushdown systems (see [8] , [9] ). It consists in adding iteratively new transitions to the automaton A according to saturation rules (reflecting the backward application of the transition rules in the system), while the set of states remains unchanged. Therefore, we define A pre * to be the P-automaton (Q, Γ, T , P, F, f ), where f and T are computed using the following saturation rules: initially f = f and T = T ; α 1 : If r = p, γ → p , w ∈ ∆ and there exists in T a path π = p w − − → T q. Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (π) such that r ∈ θ. Let t = (p, γ, q).
• If t is not in the current automaton, we add it to T and define its corresponding image by f as follows:
• If t is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding Θ r to the current f (t ).
−−−−→ p ∈ ∆ c and there exists in T a transition t = p γ − → T q, where γ ∈ Γ. Let t = (p, γ, q ). Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (t) such that r ∈ θ and r 2 ∈ θ.
• If t is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding {θ | ∃θ ∈ Θ r , θ = (θ \ {r 2 }) ∪ {r 1 } or θ = θ ∪ {r 1 }} to the current f (t ). The procedure above terminates since there is a finite number of states and phases.
Let us explain intuitively the role of the saturation rule (α 1 ). Let r = p, γ → p , w ∈ ∆. Consider a path in the automaton of the form p 
This means, by definition of P-automata, that the configuration c = ( p , γw , θ ) is accepted by A pre * . If r and r 2 are in θ , then the configuration c = ( p, γw , θ) is a predecessor of c, where θ = (θ \ {r 2 }) ∪ {r 1 } or θ = θ ∪ {r 1 } (case where r 2 is already in θ before applying the rule r). Therefore, it should be added to A pre * . This configuration is accepted by the run p Thus, we can show that:
VI. EFFICIENT COMPUTATION OF post * IMAGES
The computation of post * images is similar to the pre * computation above. Let P = (P, Γ, ∆, ∆ c ) be a SM-PDS, and let A = (Q, Γ, T, P, F, f ) be a P-automaton that represents a regular set of configurations C ( C = L(A)). Similarly, it is not optimal to compute post * (C) using the translations of Sections II-B and II-C to compute equivalent PDSs or symbolic PDSs, and then apply the algorithms of [9] , [4] . We present in this section a direct and efficient algorithm that computes post * (C). We assume w.l.o.g. that A has no transitions leading to an initial state. Moreover, we assume that the rules of ∆ are of the form p, γ → p , w , where |w| ≤ 2. This is not a restriction, indeed, a rule of the form p, γ → p , γ 1 · · · γ n , n > 2 can be replaced by the following rules:
As previously, the construction of A post * consists in adding iteratively new transitions to the automaton A according to saturation rules (reflecting the forward application of the transition rules in the system). We define A post * to be the Pautomaton (Q, Γ, T , P, F, f ), where f and T are computed using the following saturation rules: initially f = f and T = T ; β 1 : If r = p, γ → p , ∈ ∆ and there exists in T a path π = p γ − → T q. Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (π) such that r ∈ θ. Let t = (p , , q).
• If t is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding Θ r to f (t ). β 2 : If r = p, γ → p , γ ∈ ∆ and there exists in T a path π = p γ − → T q. Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (π) such that r ∈ θ. Let t = (p , γ , q).
• If t is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding Θ r to f (t ). β 3 : If r = p, γ → p , γ 1 γ 2 ∈ ∆ and there exists in T a path π = p γ − → T q. Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (π) such that r ∈ θ. Let q Θr p γ1 be a new state labeled with Θ r . Let t = (p , γ 1 , q Θr p γ1 ) and t = (q Θr p γ1 , γ 2 , q).
• If t (or t ) is not in the current automaton, we add it to T and define its corresponding image by f as follows: f (t ) = Θ r (f (t ) = Θ r ).
• If t (or t ) is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding Θ r to the current f (t ) (f (t )).
−−−−→ p ∈ ∆ c and there exists in T a path π = p γ − → T q, where γ ∈ Γ. Let Θ r be the set of phases θ in f (π) such that r ∈ θ, and r 1 ∈ θ. Let t = (p , γ, q).
• If t is already in the current automaton, we update its corresponding image by f by adding {θ | ∃θ ∈ Θ r , θ = (θ \ {r 1 }) ∪ {r 2 }} to the current f (t ). The procedure above terminates since there is a finite number of states and phases.
Let us explain intuitively the role of the saturation rules above. Consider a path in the automaton of the form p
This means, by definition of P-automata, that the configuration c = ( p, γw , θ) is accepted by A post * .
Let r = p, γ → p , ∈ ∆. If r is in θ, then the configuration c = ( p , w , θ) is a successor of c. Therefore, it should be added to A post * . This configuration is accepted by the run p − → T q If r = p, γ → p , γ 1 γ 2 ∈ ∆ is in θ, then the configuration c = ( p , γ 1 γ 2 w , θ) is a successor of c. Therefore, it should be added to A post * . This configuration is accepted by the run p VII. EXPERIMENTS A. Our algorithms vs. standard pre * and post * algorithms of PDSs We implemented our algorithms in a tool. To compare the performance of our algorithms against the approach that consists in translating the SM-PDS into an equivalent PDS or symbolic PDS and then apply the standard post * and pre * algorithms for PDSs and symbolic PDSs [9] , [4] , we first applied our tool on randomly generated SM-PDSs of various sizes. The results of the comparision using the pre * (resp. post * ) algorithms are reported in Table 1 (resp. Table 2 ). In Table 1 , Column Size is the number of transitions of the SM-PDS. Column SM-PDS gives the cost it takes to apply our direct algorithm to compute the pre * for the given SM-PDS. Column PDS shows the cost it takes to get the equivalent PDS from the SM-PDS. Column Symbolic PDS reports the cost it takes to get the equivalent Symbolic PDS from the SM-PDS. Column Result1 reports the cost it takes to get the pre * analysis of Moped [4] for the PDS we got. Column Total1 is the total cost it takes to translate the SM-PDS into a PDS and then apply the standard pre * algorithm of Moped (Total1=PDS+Result1). Column Result2 reports the cost it takes to get the pre * analysis of Moped for the symbolic PDS we got. Column Total2 is the total cost it takes to translate the SM-PDS into a symbolic PDS and then apply the standard pre * algorithm of Moped (Total2=Symbolic PDS+Result2). "error" in the table means failure of Moped, because the size of the relations involved in the symbolic transitions is huge. Hence, we mark − for the total execution time. You can see that our direct algorithm (Column SM-PDS) is much more efficient. Table 2 shows the performance of our post * algorithm. The meaning of the columns are exactly the same as for the pre * case, but using the post * algorithms instead. You can see from this table that applying our direct post * algorithm on the SM-PDS is much better than translating the SM-PDS to an equivalent PDS or symbolic PDS, and then applying the standard post * algorithms of Moped. Going through PDSs or symbolic PDSs is less efficient and leads to memory out in several cases.
B. Malware Detection
Self-modifying code is widely used as an obfuscation technique for malware writers. Thus, we applied our tool for malware detection. We consider self-modifying versions of 13 well known malwares. In these versions, the malicious behaviors are unreachable if one does not take into account that the self-modifying piece of code will change the malware code: if the code does not change, the part that contains the malicious behavior cannot be reached; after executing the self-modifying code, the control point will jump to the part containing the malicious behavior.
We model such malwares in two ways: (1) first, we take into account the self-modifying piece of code and use SM-PDSs to represent these programs as discussed in Section III-B, (2) second, we don't take into account that this part of the code is self-modifying and we treat it as all the other instructions of the program. In this case, we model these programs by a standard PDS following the translation of [5] .
The results are reported in Table 3 , Column Example reports the name of the worm. Column SM-PDS shows the result obtained by applying our method to check the reachability of the entry point of the malicious block. Column PDS gives the result if we apply the traditional PDS translation of programs (without taking into account the semantics of self modifying code) method to check the reachability of the entry point of the malicious block. Y stands for yes (the program is malicious) and N stands for no (the program is benign). As it can be seen, our techniques that go through SM-PDS to model self modifying code is able to conclude that the entry point of the malicious block is reachable, whereas the standard PDS translation from programs fails to reach this conclusion. 
